Peter Harnik discusses ideas from his new book Urban Green: Innovate Parks for Resurgent Cities on the Trust for Public Land’s City Parks blog:

We asked Peter Harnik to answer some questions about his new book, Urban Green: Innovative Parks for Resurgent Cities, that covers how cities can plan for parks as well as how to create them in “all built-out” settings.

Your book addresses many age-old questions about parks and cities. Let’s start with the big one — how much parkland should a city have?

“Should” is the wrong verb. “Should” implies that the outcome is decided by planners. The right verb is “want”: “How much parkland do we as residents and taxpayers want?” It’s a political issue, and it’s got to be approached politically by building a base of active park supporters. Every city has a different geography, a different history and a different culture — it’s not one size fits all. I think people sometimes use the word “should” in the hopes that someone else will do the work for them. No great park system was created solely by planners using official standards.

But still — don’t even advocates need to know how their city compares to others?

Oh, definitely! That’s why I give some comparative numbers in the book and many more on our web page (at www.tpl.org/cityparkfacts). If you take a trip to Boston or Minneapolis and like what you see, you can compare what your city has with them — everything from acreage to playgrounds to recreation centers to swimming pools. Which is why I always say it’s not just about gross acreage. One place may have lots of young people primarily interested in sports fields, another may be tilted toward older folks who want walking trails through bird-filled marshes. The environment also matters: some cities easily support lush forested parks, others are built on arid deserts where trees are essentially alien species. But the most important factor is population density. Crowded New York and San Francisco have so much concrete everywhere that every added pocket park is magical. Roomy Jacksonville and Oklahoma City, with thousands of large suburban-style yards are already halfway natural even not counting their parks. Density has a major impact on how people think about parks and how they use them.

Read more at the City Parks blog or learn more about Urban Green

Peter Gleick, author of Bottled and Sold, reads East of Eden:

“And it never failed that during the dry years the people forgot about the rich years, and during the wet years they lost all memory of the dry years. It was always that way.”

‘It was always that way’ about water, and it still is. And if we are to have any hope of changing this cycle of crisis and forgetfulness, we have to start thinking differently.

California has just suffered through three years of drought. Certainly not the first such drought and certainly not the last. And during the drought, we had the opportunity to think differently, to do things differently. But we failed to do so.

That’s Bill McKibben’s concern about the Straight Up author. From the Washington Monthly:

Romm’s hyper-realism may ignore more important political possibilities. He’s paid less attention to the emerging popular movement on climate change than to the machinations of the Senate, but if we’re actually going to get change on the scale we need, it’s quite possible it won’t happen without an aggressive, large, and noisy movement demanding that change. And Romm, who would have a good deal of useful things to say to such a movement, hasn’t been very interested. He’s deeply Washington centric. And in that he’s not alone—most of the D.C. green movement has pretty much written off organizing out in the hinterlands in favor of lobbying in the offices of senators and congressmen. The problem with that strategy, though, is that effective lobbying depends on senators and congressmen actually perceiving that there’s some pain involved in doing the easy thing and stalling action. (Pain beyond wrecking the planet—I’m talking real pain, like losing an election.)

Elizabeth Grossman, author of Chasing Molecules and High Tech Trash, visits the Louisiana coast:

Grand Isle was hit hard by Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Gustav. But the community, which island resident Jeannine Braud describes as “a family,” rebuilt. “You knew when that [disaster] was over. You’d wake up and hear hammers,” she says. But then came the financial meltdown and the bad weather winter of 2009 that kept tourists away. “This season was going to be the one that got us over the hump,” says Hopkins.

But coastal residents see no end to this disaster. “It’s not just shut off this year but for years and possibly generations to come,” says [Louisiana resident Karen] Hopkins of the fishing, shrimping, and shellfish harvests that sustain Gulf Coast communities.

Read the whole post at the Pump Handle.

Commenting on the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, Rob Young, coastal geologist and co-author of The Rising Sea, writes:

In their rush to react to growing public pressure and do something, federal and state officials are waiving scientific review of emergency measures and embracing dubious solutions. Nowhere is this more evident than in the proposal to begin building a long sand berm to prevent oil from reaching wetlands and beaches in Louisiana. The White House has announced that this project is now moving forward, despite serious concerns among coastal scientists, including myself, that it will not be effective in keeping oil from the coast, could do more environmental harm than good, and would be extremely expensive.

…The EPA directly questioned the proposed berm’s effectiveness, suggesting there is no evidence that the project will stop oil from entering the marshes and estuaries because it is constructed only in front of the barrier islands and will not block the inlets and deepwater passes. In addition, EPA questioned whether a project that will take at least 6 to 9 months to build would be completed in time to have any impact on the spill.

Young expands on his concerns in the full post.

Peter Gleick, water expert and Bottled and Sold author, sharply rebukes climate change deniers:

In recent months, a small minority of vocal climate deniers have been emboldened by minor errors identified in some of the international scientific assessments of climate change and by the publication of private email exchanges from some in the climate community. A recent independent commission in the UK, chaired by Lord Ron Oxburgh to review this debate, concluded that, “We found absolutely no evidence of impropriety whatsoever.”

Read the whole entry at the Huffington Post.

Terry Tamminen, Lives Per Gallon author, thinks we can learn from the Louisiana oil spill:

The Cape Wind project just approved for the waters offshore of Massachusetts will pump $1 billion into the local economy and create clean, reliable wind energy for decades.

The BP oil rig in the waters of the Gulf of Mexico is spewing millions of gallons of petroleum toward the coastlines of four states, incurring $6 million per day in cleanup costs and estimated to top $3 billion before it’s all over, not counting fines or damage claims from communities and the fishing industry.

Could there be any more dramatic examples this week of our choices as we invent and invest in the future of America’s energy supplies? Ironically, the current BP oil disaster spiraled out of control on the 40th anniversary of Earth Day, an annual observation that was created in part in response to a similar oil rig blowout in 1969 off the coast of Santa Barbara, CA.

[This is the fifth part of a five-part series on the issue of menhaden depletion by Charles Hutchinson; here are parts one, two, three and four. For more background information, check out The Most Important Fish in the Sea. --Ed.]

Given the fact that the ASMFC is the body with the power and responsibility to effectively manage menhaden, it would seem that the public at large should be able to communicate their needs to them. That is not so easy. There is very little interaction between Joe the Plumber and the people making decisions, supposedly,on their behalf. The ASMFC holds its Management meetings on, roughly, 90 day intervals. That is the only time business is conducted. These meetings are open to the public, held in various locations on the east coast, with Washington being the most frequent. Travel expenses for the commissioners, staff and other associated personnel are paid for by your tax dollars, all others are on their own. Costs may be one reason the attendance is generally low. Most of those who do attend are representatives of various fishing or environmental groups. Obviously they represent their stakeholders and thus can serve at least some segments of the public.

One of the unique features of these meetings is that at the beginning of the meeting the public is requested to comment on anything not on the agenda. That gets the public out of the way so the business of business can be carried out with minimal interference. If in the course of the meeting a motion is put forward requiring a vote. the public MAY be permitted to address the subject. This doesn’t always happen, its at the discretion of the chairperson and the time is very limited. Public comment can be submitted before a meeting to the ASMFC staff. In 2005, 26,000 comments were received relative to the then proposed cap on menhaden harvest in the Chesapeake Bay, more by far than were submitted on any subject before or since. The public rejected the cap and asked for restrictions on the reduction harvest. The effect was nil. As history will show, no action was taken on restricting harvest, the cap was put in place, and the public no longer seems willing to participate significantly.

How, then, can the public influence the management board? The lead commissioner from each state, generally, is the Director of Fisheries or similar position. He/she is the spokesperson for the three person team. In order for the states vote to count, a majority have to be in agreement. So perhaps a way to get something done is to bombard these individuals with requests that your state propose or support a motion to take measurable and positive action to increase the stock of menhaden by reducing the harvest. Following is a current listing of these lead commissioners. G Lapointe(ME), Doug Grout(NH), P Diodati(MA), Mark Gibson(RI), David Simpson(CT), James Gilmore(NY), Peter Himchak(NJ), P Emory(DE), Tom O’Connell(MD), Jack Travelstead(VA), Louis Daniel(NC), Spud Woodward(GA), Jessica McCauley(FL). As many letters as possible should be sent to these administrative appointees so that they are aware that people in their state know who they are and want positive action taken. Copies should go to the Secretary of Natural Resources for your state so that both know what the mood of the public is.

There is at the ASMFC offices a coordinator for each Management Board. For menhaden it is Braddock Spear. His address is 1444 Eye St. NW Washington, DC 20005 His email address is Bspear@ASMFC.org. He keeps tab on how many comments are being received. For example, total comments received in regard to extending the cap beyond the 2010 expiration date was 222 (long way from 26,000) of which 186 were against extending the cap which was extended never the less. From the preceding you can see that public input has been routinely ignored. That may be because it has been directed to the more or less amorphous Management Board as a whole. Perhaps if the commentary is more directly aimed at the state representatives who are the direct beneficiaries of our taxes and are more readily reachable we may become more effective. At least its a place to start. More on an organized approach in a future article.

[This is the fourth part of a five-part series on the issue of menhaden depletion by Charles Hutchinson; here are parts one, two, and three. For more background information, check out The Most Important Fish in the Sea. --Ed.]

The role of the Federal Government in menhaden regulation is harder to fathom. When Congress created the ASMFC some decisions had to be made as to who would regulate what. If the fish were characterized as inshore the ASMFC was given regulatory responsibility. If the species was offshore the responsibility remained with the Feds. Menhaden are primarily an inshore species, but do travel and reside in Federal waters as well. The dividing line for jurisdictional purposes is the 3 mile limit. From 3 miles offshore to 200 miles is the EEZ which is under Federal control. Beyond 200 miles they are International Waters which is another nightmare entirely.

For our purposes the waters up to the 3 mile limit are of primary concern and the “ States Rights” issue tends to keep the Feds out of it. Menhaden are not regulated in any fashion in the EEZ. Records show that increasingly the reduction industry (Omega) is finding fishing in the EEZ more profitable and less restrictive. Now more than 50% of the harvest is offshore. That has created some interesting effects. Much of the catch is off the New Jersey coast resulting recently in increased concern by New Jersey residents by what is occurring in their waters as Omega efficiently reduces the menhaden abundance in their area. As the fishing pressure increases offshore, some of the migratory habits of the menhaden are changing. Most notable is the absence of menhaden off the coast of North Carolina in the winter months and an increase in the Chesapeake Bay. Notable also is the absence of stripers in NC since bait is harder to find and an increase in large migratory stripers in the Chesapeake Bay. There are reports of decreasing catches of stripers in the northeast, particularly in Maine and Massachusetts. All of these conditions are good indicators that the availability of menhaden to support predators is becoming a problem over a wide area.

It is a fact that Federal legislation can override state regulations as demonstrated by the newly reauthorized Stevens Magnuson Act which has provisions for rebuilding stocks classified as overfished that states find onerous. It is also a fact that the Feds could at any time prohibit the harvesting of menhaden in Federal Waters but have shown little desire to do so. Part of this reluctance is the recognition that to do so would probably result in an uproar from the State of Virginia and more directly from Omega. Omega would claim such an action would put the Reedville operation out of business. If such a regulation were applied to Federal waters, and if the ASMFC had not taken any measures to restrict harvesting in VA waters, then Omega could harvest the Bay without restriction Con centrating all of Omega’s catch in Virginia would be devastating to the Bay’s ecology.

Legislation to halt the harvest of menhaden was introduced in 2008 in the House by representatives Saxton(NJ) and Gilchrest(MD) and got a sparsely attended hearing by the subcommittee on fisheries. It died there. Similarly a 2009 bill in the Senate by Cardin(MD) for improving restoration of Chesapeake Bay water quality contained a provision for eliminating the commercial fishing for menhaden in the Bay which died before it was introduced. Unmentioned was the opposition from VA which had much to do with its removal.

Basically its a catch 22 problem. The Feds have delegated responsibility to the ASMFC and wish to avoid the States Rights issues that might arise by enacting legislation to override ASMFC. There are also jurisdictional issues at play here but in reality it is more of the political baloney that seems to be overwhelming in Washington. The power to do what is needed is there but the political will to do so is not.

[This is the third part of a five-part series on the issue of menhaden depletion by Charles Hutchinson; here are parts one and two. For more background information, check out The Most Important Fish in the Sea. --Ed.]

At the center of the menhaden controversy is the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission (ASMFC). It is central to this issue because it is the regulatory authority over menhaden and many other species as well. ASMFC was created by congress in 1942 by what is termed the Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management Act. The act defines the role of ASMFC as follows” The responsibility for managing Atlantic Coast Fisheries rests with the States, which carry out a cooperative program of fishery oversight and management thru the ASMFC. It is the responsibility of the Federal Government to support such cooperative interstate management of fishery resources”. The role of the Feds is to support financially the activities of the commissioners and staff. While the Feds fund the operations they have no oversight responsibility with respect to whether or not the actions of ASMFC are productive. Hence there is no accountability for their performance. This is a poor situation from the perspective of the public who have no where to turn when they are dissatisfied with the management of their resources.

The ASMFC manages many species and the format is the same for all species. Each species has a Management Board. The Board is composed of three commissioners from each of the 15 states plus a representative from National Marine Fisheries Service, US Fish and Wildlife, and from the Potomac River Commission. To assist the Boards There is a professional staff in Washington which serves all the management boards as well as two committees. One is the Technical Committee to advise on technical matters, and the second is the Advisory Panel which is intended to provide input from the various stakeholders. The commissioners from each state are the Director of Fisheries, a state legislator, and an appointee by the Governor of the state.

The Menhaden Board has set forth it’s objectives as follows ”to manage the Atlantic Menhaden fishery in a manner that is biologically, economically, socially and ecologically sound, while protecting the resource and those who benefit from it.” They don’t seem to have done a very good job of achieving these objectives. There are probably a number of reasons for the poor performance. Some that come to mind quickly are:
1 The ASMFC as an organization is responsible to no one but themselves. As a practical matter if one is not responsible or accountable what incentive is there to actually “manage” which inherently means making decisions and taking action which will be unpopular with some stakeholders.
2 Congress, who set up the organizational structure, failed to build in accountability and either doesn’t recognize this flaw or does not feel it necessary to correct it. ASMFC should be a part of one of the major departments such as Commerce. The public needs to have some recourse when it’s resources are being mismanaged and no such avenue is currently available.
3 Take a look at the composition of the commissioners. At least 70% are bureaucrats. As such they are generally not proactive and shun risk .In the case of menhaden there is the additional problem of the state of Virginia and Omega Protein. Any action of substance to increase stock size by reducing harvesting will impinge on Omega’s operation and perhaps their bottom line. They will vigorously oppose any such move thus putting the Management Board in an uncomfortable position which they would rather avoid.

There could hardly be a situation more conducive to failure than to have a quasi government agency populated by risk adverse managers with no accountability for their performance.